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7Information cost, learning, and trust
Lessons from co-operation and higher-order capabilities amongst geographically
proximate firms
Mark Lorenzen
Introduction
Trust is a most interesting economic notion, but, due to the traditional differences of method
and ontology between economists with methodological individualist and collectivist points of
departure, theorists have largely failed to come to a fruitful understanding of trust, and, thereby,
to bring organisational economics a significant step forward. In this short paper, I put forward
an argument about trust based upon an information cost perspective. I hope thereby to
contribute to a notion of trust encompassing insights from different theoretical fields, enabling
us to grasp the different origins of trust.
First, I argue that if we limit the definition of trust to a state of an agent (the expectancy of
honesty), we may probe into the different possible origins of trust. Such origins combine or
follow each other in a sequence resulting in trust. In various contexts, different origins of trust
come to dominate. Then, resting my argument upon an empirical case study, I propose that this
can be understood in an information cost perspective: The availability and type of information
in a context give rise to a particular way of trusting, learned by the single agents. Even if this is
an evolutionary argument, it is not overly functionalist: Trust does not always arise when
needed. I end the paper by briefly discussing the information cost of the various origins of trust,
and why geographical proximity may propagate information of importance for one of these
origins, resulting in ‘ascriptive’ trust.
81. Co-operation and information cost
Co-operation as an asset
With a growing dominance on many markets of strategies of continuos specialisation; flexible
co-ordination (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990; Sayer & Walker, 1992; Schoenberger, 1988;
1997) and inter-firm technological learning1 (Lundvall, 1985; 1992), co-operation between
firms is - seen in the “resource-based” perspective (e.g. Wernerfelt, 1984; Winter, 1988;
Chandler, 1992; Langlois, 1998) crucial for achievement of capabilities2. For groups of firms,
realising external economies (Marshall, 1891, Krugman, 1995); co-operation gives rise to
“higher-order” capabilities (Foss, 1996).
Co-operation as a theoretical problem
Co-operation, however common in real life, is not as easily grasped within organisational
economic theory as one should expect, because of the predominating assumption of agents’
maximising behaviour. Information about market contingencies and technological possibilities
will, in most cases, be asymmetrically distributed between business firms (managers); and they
will, before they initiate co-operation, know little about each others’ incentives and goals (I
shall touch upon determinants of the degree of such information imperfection in section 6). The
danger of the partner acting opportunistically3 (that is, shirking; holding-up; terminating the co-
operation before time;  stealing business ideas; etc.) withstanding, why would agents at all
choose to enter into co-operation and risk their investments (or even their existence)?
                                           
1
 Here, inter-firm “technological learning” is much similar to “innovation”. At a later stage, I shall make an
argument about ‘institutional’ or ‘social’ learning (Johnson, 1992).
2
 I choose not to go into a detailed discussion about the differences between “resources” and “capabilities”. See
Foss (1996).
3
 In much work within modern economics of organisation (e.g. transaction cost economics), agents’ inclination
towards opportunistic behaviour has also become an assumption as Friedman likes them: Widely applied;
reasonably fruitful - and, in most cases, utterly unrealistic. But already Malmgren (1961) suggested that a theory
of the firm does not have to rest upon this assumption.
9Even if one proposes that agents have no incentives towards acting opportunistically when they
expect future pay-offs (Roscher, 1989; Casson, 1991), one cannot explain how co-operation is
initiated if one maintains the assumptions of imperfect information and maximising behaviour:
Why should agents at all dare to initiate a co-operation; given the risk that their partner might
escape with the entire profit?
2. Trust
Trust as an asset
If managers trust each other not to act opportunistically,  economic action (co-operation) is
“lubricated” (Arrow, 1974). Such trust is of economic value, because it allows agents to initiate
and maintain co-operation - without making costly safeguards. If trust is common or “social”
amongst a whole group of agents (Coleman, 1984), widespread, flexible co-operation (i.e. with
possibilities to shift between partners or combine different co-operations) is a real option. The
importance of trust for economic action and co-operation applies both on principal-agent
relationships within firms4; relationships between firms and customers5; and between managers
of independent business firms (both in vertical and horizontal firm relations). Because trust is
both valuable; non-ubiquitous; and specific, it can be seen as a capability or higher-order
capability6.
                                           
4
 The significance of “corporate culture” for co-operation between management and labour (Kreps, 1990) is an
illustration.
5
 The importance of “reputations” or “brands” illustrates this.
6
 Trust can be seen as a higher-order capability, because it per definition exists between agents (it is a social
relation, a ‘dyad’, or in the case of social trust, a relationship between many agents); and it is non-imitable by
others (a third manager will find a trust-based relationship between two others causally ambiguous - and will in
any case hardly be able to enter into it. In the case of social trust in a group of firms, newcomers will find it
extremely hard to ‘plug into’ such a coherent system). One may debate whether trust can be regarded as a
capability, because it is of little economic value in itself - it is the co-operation it gives rise to which is of
economic value.
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Trust as a theoretical problem
In standard economic theory, trustful expectations of firm managers is not taken into account.
Within newer theory, much of the debate on trust is flawed, partly because it threatens the
perspective of transaction costs as an overriding determinant of organisation forms
(Williamson, 1975; 1985). The rise of new institutional economics has been followed by a large
critique, mostly based upon trust arguments (e.g. Granovetter, 1985; Lorenz, 1988; Craswell
1993; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), and surely, if we accept that the fear of opportunism is
overstated by economic theorists and that co-operation may be achieved without costly
contracts (not only within hierarchies but also, in many cases, on the market)(Macaulay, 1963),
the whole transaction cost argument is on the verge of collapse. This is probably why to
Williamson (1993), trust is a ‘sociologic’ notion, not for economists to explain.
Trust is a problematical notion, because it relates so closely to the classic - and somewhat
fruitless - economics/sociology distinction. Some economists from within the more orthodox
camp (e.g. Maskell, 1990) maintain that when managers seem to act trustfully, it is nothing but
a ‘behavioural symptom’ of real, underlying economic causes (i.e. agents do not really trust,
they just maximise, and if it is most rational to act as if one trusted each other, so be it).
However, within economic organisation theory, it has now become a central issue to somehow
incorporate the empirical fact that, in many cases, managers do seem to trust each other. Some
economists even find the origin of trust so important to investigate that they want to broaden
their scope and cross some trenches in order to do so. Traditionally, economists who have tried
to cross trenches, striving to incorporate institutional perspectives into economics, have but
failed to give a theoretical account for institutions, and, in spite of a Nobel prize, got a
reputation within the orthodox economist circles as mainly ‘historicist’ economists7. With the
growing impact of (and body of work within) ‘modern’ institutional perspectives8 within
                                           
7
 In much work within this realm are given quite detailed descriptions of the nature of social institutions. Exactly
how causal connections should run from such institutions to the single agent is less accounted for. This is a classic
problem of methodological collectivism.
8
 The (embryonic) resurrection of ‘old’ institutionalist perspectives (see e.g. Hodgson, 1988).
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economics, there is, however a better chance of coming to grasp with institutions and
understand their implications for single agents’ behaviour.
A definition of trust
In the following, I shall define trust as a state of an agent, namely
“an expectation of a manager9 that his (potential) business partner will not act
opportunistically - even if he holds no power over him to ensure that he behaves”
(see e.g. Lorenz, 1992).
With this definition, trust is not necessarily a two-way phenomenon: An agent may trust another
agent non-reciprocally. Further, trust per se is not correlated to one or few causes: Expectations
of the agent need not be founded on some security in order to qualify as “trust”. It is not
whether there is risk that matters for the definition: It is the manager’s perception of risk.
This separation of “trust” from “cause” allows us to investigate the different possible origins of
trust. Trust is namely not necessarily a stable state, and, depending on its context, may
disappear. At the other hand, over time, different origins may give rise to a qualitatively similar
expectation: Trust, allowing agents to co-operate. What I propose is thus basically a dynamic
conception of trust.
3. The different origins of trust
What becomes more and more clear with case studies on trust (Dei Ottari, 1984; Lorenz, 1988;
Sako, 1992; Sabel, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Maskell et. al., 1998; Storper & Salais,
                                           
9
 Naturally, all firms are not controlled by a single manager. But to avoid repeated, lengthy reservations  in the
following, I shall nevertheless use the simplified term “manager” for the dominant decisionmaker(s) in a firm.
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1997;Lorenzen, forthcoming), is that expectations of honesty can have many different
institutional origins, spanning from regulation (firm-level contracts and society-level
conventions) to cognition (ascription).
Trust-building over time
The most common perspective on trust is that it is something co-operating agents build over
time. There are two, qualitatively different, arguments about this.
First, there is a learning perspective: When agents co-operate towards a common goal, exchange
information, and get to know each other better, they build trust. In the literature on firm-level
“organisational learning” (e.g. Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991), there are few direct
references to trustbuilding. In the Swedish ‘network school’ (e.g. Håkansson 1989), on the other
hand, there are many, empirically founded, insights on trustbuilding as a by-product of co-
operation. These insights, however appealing, tell only half the story: They give important
evidence about how trust may be enhanced on the road through ongoing information exchange
between firms, but they say little about the trust it took to initiate the co-operation. In other
words, they make up a “functional” explanation (Ullmann-Margalit, 1978; Elster, 1983) of how
trust is maintained or strengthened and not an “aggregate” explanation of its origin10.
Secondly, there is a sunk cost perspective. When firms place “hostages” (Schelling, 1960;
Williamson, 1983), i.e. sink investments into transaction-specific assets which they will lose if
they destroy the co-operation (Maskell, 1990), they can trust each other not to act
opportunistically. However, this argument does not explain how the co-operation got started at
all. Why should firms dare sink investments into the co-operation in the first place? Again, this
is an explanation of how trust is maintained, not initiated.
                                           
10Or rather, trust is perceived both as a ‘process’ and as an ‘outcome’. This makes it hard to study what started the
cumulative process.
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Trust through contract
As mentioned, contract theory gives us little insight into how trust is initiated, because there are
so many cases where trust is present independent on contracts - and so many examples of how
contracts were not sufficient cause for trust11. As I shall come back to later, a main reason for
this is that written contracts and working rules suffer from severe information problems. There
may be cases, however, where agents base initial trust on formalisation, and the - albeit in some
cases hypothetical - security provided by enforcement of contracts and agreements.
Trust through social regulation
It seems difficult for homines economici to construct an atmosphere of trust and co-operation by
themselves - no matter how many contracts they write up. Luckily, agents are not isolated, but
embedded in societies, making economic action possible (Veblen, 1919). Institutionalist
economists (e.g. Menger, 1963) point towards the importance of the “institutional
environment”, i.e. social (as opposed to firm-specific) institutions (North & Thomas, 1973).
Regulative institutions like laws; rules; or conventions backed up by systems of social
regulation (ranging from enprisonment to retaliation) can facilitate trust amongst agents. Social
regulation practised by a majority of participating agents in a group, tying significant social
costs (e.g. social isolation; withdrawal of reciprocity) to breach of social conventions, is an
efficient origin of trust in closely knit “communities” (Taylor, 1982). Even if social regulation
is not perfectly efficient (e.g. due to the monitoring problems I shall touch upon later), few will
act opportunistically, and, more importantly, most agents would expect each other to act
honestly.
Ascriptive trust
This leads us to another important aspect of institutions: Their cognitive function. Because trust
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 Actually, exactly the absence of contracts is taken as an indicator of trust by several researchers (e.g. Lorenz,
1988; Sako, 1992; Barney & Hansen, 1994).
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is defined as an expectancy of honesty, not a security against opportunism, cognitive institutions
like fellow-feeling and other aspects of a common ‘culture’ are grounds enough for trust
amongst agents (Casson, 1997). They may interpret each others’ actions and motives, ascribing
honesty (or dishonesty) to each other on the basis on some social characteristics. Such
‘ascriptive trust’ (see e.g. Lorenz & Lazaric forthcoming) may be present amongst agents who
belong the same family; social community (Taylor, 1982); religion; or political conviction.
Further, it may be common to place ascriptive trust in agents who belong to a specific
profession, e.g. doctors (Fukuyama, 1995).
Combinations and sequences of origins
The different possible origins of trust must, naturally, not be seen as single-standing. In real life,
they are combined, and/or, follow in a sequence. At the societal level (e.g. nations), social
regulation, contracts, and social coherence are combined origins of trust and co-operation
between agents. For the single firm, trust may be achieved first based on contract and law (most
contracts demands enforcement through law; making institutions external to the co-operation
itself central), later on sunk costs, later again on friendship (Maskell et. al., 1998). In the first
stage, the investments made may be small, and the information available to the agents, albeit
imperfect, sufficient for them to make such a small investment. Then, step by step, more
investments are made, the scope of the co-operation is broadened, more information is
exchanged - and trust is enhanced. It may be hard to imagine following the sequence in ‘reverse
order’: Moving from ascriptive trust to a more formalised origin of trust. Theoretically, there is
however no reason why this could not take place.
Even if different origins of trust may play together, and the dominant origin of trust may shift,
here is no doubt that in different contexts, particular origins of trust have come to dominate.
There can also be given examples of contexts where there seems to be no origins of trust
present - and thus, problems of achieving co-operation.
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Sako (1992) has pointed towards national differences in how managers trust. Because of
different institutional environments, managers generally place trust on different grounds in UK
and Japan. Hence, cross-cultural co-operation may be difficult12. Sometimes, the origins of trust
may be so specific to a particular community that it is virtually closed to outsiders. Even if the
Jewish diamond dealers described by Ben-Porath (1980) enjoy strong trust-based co-operation,
its origin lies within a closed community, difficult to ‘plug into’ for newcomers. Several studies
within contexts as different as 1970s Italy (Putnam, 1993) and 1980s Pennsylvania (Sabel,
1993) show that when trust is not founded by some social (i.e. external to the firm) institutions,
it can be different, if not impossible, to create, and co-operation hard to achieve.
What is it that determine which origin to trust that comes to dominate in a particular context;
and whether trust will shift origin? What determines whether there is a ‘sequence’ of origins to
trust in a context, what determines where agents ‘plug into’ the sequence, and to which other
possible origins they may move?
Game theory illustrates this question very well: “Co-operation games” may have different
equilibria, not all being optimal (Axelrod, 1984; Sugden, 1986). Game theory itself - such is its
nature - fail to give an account for what determines in which equilibrium single agents may find
themselves. In a trust perspective, one may say that it is illustrated that some agents may end up
co-operating and enhancing trust (in a step-by-step or sunk cost perspective), but even if there
are attempts of treating trust in game theory (e.g. Dupuy & Torre, 1996; Nooteboom, 1996),
game theory alone cannot give an account for the reasons that some agents end up in a positive
feed-back loop,  trusting each other, and some not13.
Through case studies, I have investigated trust amongst managers of a group of geographically
clustered firms (Lorenzen, 1997; 1998; forthcoming). I have tried to give an account for the
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 This is coherent with Lam’s (1998) findings.
13
 In the spirit of e.g. Foss (1998), I would argue that if one wants to use a game-theoretic metaphor, the creation of
trust should be seen as a game of co-ordination (basically an issue of information cost) rather than a Prisoner’s
Dilemma-type game (basically an issue of incentive differences).
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origin of this trust, and how this origin have come to dominate amongst a whole group of
agents. Below, I shall sketch out some of my results in order to bring our discussion forward.
4. Empirical example
In order to investigate the importance of geographical proximity for trust (and hence co-
operation; flexible co-ordination and higher-order capabilities), I have focused upon the Danish
industrial district of Salling in West Jutland14, where I have conducted case studies 1993-1994
and 1997-199815.
Co-operation and higher-order capabilities in the Salling district
In Salling, trust is a higher-order capability: The small and medium-sized furniture producers
localised in the area make up an industrial system of both producers of finished goods and pure
subsuppliers; and they achieve competitiveness on export markets through specialisation and
widespread co-operation16. Flexible specialisation makes a large number of product varieties
possible for many producers, while geographical proximity help to keep lead times short or
moderate compared to competitors17. In turn, the single firms pass on excess orders to other
local firms, keeping production within the district. Inter-firm technological learning - even
based on advice and gossip passed on between local firms that do not co-operate directly - lead
to continuos product and process innovations. Further, new co-operate relations are initiated
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 The Danish furniture industry is to a high - and growing - degree agglomerated in West Jutland. The regional
agglomeration especially applies to producers of wooden furniture of the basic or knock-down type, localised in
the ‘emerging’ (i.e., hitherto rural) industrial areas of West Jutland. In the peninsular of Salling, over a hounded
producers of furniture and related wood products have agglomerated over a century. The agglomeration is
accelerating, especially from 1970s, since when numerous entrepreneurs have left the crisis-ridden construction
industry to start up furniture firms. The agglomeration in the Salling area is remarkable, because the industrial
record of the area compared to other ‘fairy tales’ of industrialisation in the former rural areas is fairly modest.
15
 The case studies encompass 21 interviews in furniture firms; a local bank; credit association; producer’s
association (guild); industrial development agency; labour union; and technical school. Further, 4 intensive case
studies, encompassing several interviews and time-studies of one week’s duration were carried out.
16
 These advantages are expressed in a growth in number of firms and employment (both absolute and relative to
the Danish average) during the 1990s.
17
 Today, short lead times are crucial on many furniture markets, e.g. in Germany, to where Salling firms have a
high export rate.
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directly aiming at innovations: Achieving critical mass or access to other firms’ competencies in
order to export to new markets; start up production in Eastern Europe; design new types of
products or to certify existing products. Both long-term subcontracting; passing-on of orders;
experimental co-operations; and passed-on gossip and advice giving is based on trust. The case
studies show that managers expect no opportunistic behaviour from their partners.
Ascriptive trust in the Salling district
The case studies show that the producers write no contracts; and make few or no safeguards
when co-operating - and this applies even when partners who have not co-operated earlier
initiate a new venture. Hence, their trust must be based on either social regulation and/or
ascription.
In the area, the relatively coherent social community comprised by the local producers’
association (guild) with almost 70 member firms might facilitate social regulation against those
who act opportunistically. Several of the interviewed managers claim that if a local firm acts
opportunistically, he is ruled out of the community of the guild. None of the interviewed
managers can, however, give any examples of others who have acted in this way, nor of anyone
who have been punished. In general, the case studies show that local social regulation may
actually play a minor role as a basis for trust, and that gossip and warnings against local firms
that did not perform well or acted less decently in a co-operation is surprisingly modest (and
often, not listened to). The chairman of the guild adds that there is no formal way of punishing
any member of the guild for non-collegial behaviour, simply because there has so far never been
a need for it.
It seems that the fact that the managers believe in the social regulation is more important than it
actually being efficient. Further, many of the managers interviewed actually claimed that they
felt safe co-operating with other local managers, no matter if social regulation was present or
not: Trust was “just there”; something we have always had”; “just the way we do in this area”;
“a cultural thing”. This “culture” allegedly prescribe that opportunism from a local partner is
18
not likely (although it may be, if you think hard enough, it is not something you spend too much
time pondering on, and not something you plan against).
This ascriptive trust is not particularly connected to ties of kinship or personal friendship:
Kinship play a limited role, and even if managers get to be good friends in the course of their
co-operation, they often initiate co-operations with people who are encompassed by their
ascriptive trust, but with whom they are not (yet) friends. The trust which most of the
interviewed firms seem to ascribe is not reserved for particular firms, it encompasses whole
group of firms, including firms that the interviewed managers have not so far co-operated with,
maybe not even met yet. This group encompass mainly members of the local guild, and the
relevant parameters (apart from, of course, membership of the guild) seems to be craftsmanship
(as expressed by firm size; the firm’s product quality; and the manager’s education and personal
participation to the production process) and entrepreneurship (as expressed by economic
success18; willingness to take risks; personal pride in being manager-owner; and willingness to
help others to start up their own businesses). There is also a profound geographical dimension
to the ascriptive trust: First, the guild has a limited geographical hinterland. Secondly, even
within the group of firms within the guild, the ones which are localised closest together
allegedly have a closer relationship than the others.
Ascriptive trust and information cost in the Salling district
In general, the interviewed firms seemed to prefer co-operation with local firms. Being “a local”
is thus a ground in itself for ascribing trust. An important conclusion from the case studies is
that an underlying reason that local firms are more easily trusted is that it is easier to access
information about them.
Sharing of information between firms takes place through a combination of long-term and short
term vertical relations (shorter or longer specialisation subcontracting arrangements) as well as
through horizontal relations (between producers of similar products). As mentioned, there is a
                                           
18
 Albeit too much success (or too large a firm size) may be an impediment for placement of ascriptive trust.
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high degree of subsupplying amongst local firms. Further, even entrepreneurs that are
competing on products consider themselves as "colleagues" rather than competitors, and several
long-term horizontal co-operate arrangements of sales and complementarities ("networks")
witness to this attitude. Actually, it seems that even short-term vertical relations (one firm
temporarily taking on the role as capacity subsupplier) frequently are based on longer-term
horizontal relations.
Interactions on the personal level happen both within and without of the purely "economic"
sphere. The fact that many economic interactions are woven into a network of personal
relations, relations between former colleagues, former employees, or even family members,
serves to support passing on of information between managers. They willingly give advice to
their family, friends or long-term business partners. If asked, they often recommend others for a
co-operation. They also participate in the local gossip. As a result, information is available to
managers in the Salling district according to which personal networks and co-operate relations
they participate in19. Because interactions are so frequent - most firms  partake in several
business networks besides their daily social interaction with other local managers - particular
information is easily available to them. In particular, the meetings in the local producer's guild
and the private get-togethers of guild members give managers get access to a broad range of
information, personal advice, and gossip about other local managers’ actions. On these
occasions, managers reciprocally exchange not only information of technical solutions,
technological opportunities, market developments and new products, but also specific
information of the needs of potential users and the capacities and capabilities of potential
suppliers.
In interviews, several firms emphasise that even non-locals (non-members of the guild) may be
trusted, if the have “the right chemistry”. However, the availability of information about
managers who are members of the guild does that it is much easier to assess whether a local
                                           
19
 Some managers are cut off from this information availability, due to their choice not to participate to social
gatherings; and/or their low degree of specialisation and co-operation with other firms. These managers
constitute special cases, and are ignored in the generalisations in the following.
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firm (member of the guild) is of the right chemistry. Thus, due to information cost, local firms
are easier to place ascriptive trust in.
Because information exchange takes place between managers within the guild’s catchment area,
there is a geographical dimension to the information availability. However, there is also a
geographical dimension depending on simple physical proximity. First, co-operations are most
frequent between the producers localised closest to each other. The managers themselves list
transportation costs (of larger batches) as well as co-ordination costs (of more frequent
deliveries of small batches or highly specialised goods) as reasons for this. Secondly, the
producers localised in the central Salling (close to the main agglomeration of firms) participate
most frequently to the meetings in the producer’s guild.
The evolution of a origin of trust in the Salling district
To the history of co-operation and ascriptive trust in the Salling area, there is a dynamic
dimension: The system seems to have evolved over time.
In the first place, there is a particular local cultural ‘heritage’, rooted in the agricultural past of
the area. Many of today’s managers have parents or family in agriculture. This heritage has not
always given rise to the same degree of co-operation as the present. On the contrary: The
frequent co-operations is mostly a new thing, prominent amongst the new generation of firms
started up (or managers that have taken over firms) since the 1970s. This generation of firms
seems to - partly due to the greater scope for co-operation provided by new technology and
product designs - have higher degree of and co-operation than the earlier generations of
managers, and have through the 1980s and 1990s experienced several export booms that
allowed them to expand their operations and degree of co-operations. Interviews confirm that
ascriptive trust is a “new thing”, most prominent amongst the younger generation of managers.
My interpretation of this is that these firms - single managers and the group as a whole - have
been through an intensive learning process, with two prominent results.
21
Firstly, the single managers have learned for themselves that is pays to trust. Even if the
managers did not know from the start that trusting is something that pays off, their co-
operations and the resulting competitiveness has certainly given them the opportunity to learn
later that it does. The single managers have thus been through the step-by-step organisational
learning process, enhancing their trust.
Secondly, some have learned a way of trusting - and others have followed their example in a
social or ‘institutional’ (Johnson, 1992) learning process. If single firms have had repeated
positive experiences with ascriptive trust, this origin of trust is possibly seen as the most
efficient way towards co-operation. Even if a firm’s positive experiences with ascriptive trust
stems from his interaction with particular other managers, his way of trusting is ‘recycled’ and
used on still new co-operations. Thus, the local firms may have initiated some co-operations on
an ‘inherited’ ascriptive trust based on their relations to the rural past of the area or ties of
friendship or kinship. However, their present way of ascribing trust is something they have
learned through repeated interactions with other firms, and is not particularly connected to ties
of family or kinship.
Each and every firm does not have to go through a trial-and-error process of personal
experience with co-operative behaviour. Instead, it can take advantage of local information -
shared through both co-operations and gossip20 - of the experiences of the other firms. Because
of frequent passing on of advice - and because most manager have been raised in the area and
most new firms have their offspring in existing ones - managers who have not been through the
step-by-step organisational learning process can draw upon others’ experience and plug right
into the trust sequence placing ascriptive trust on the basis on the available information21.
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 My finding - that gossip may be promoting for trust - may seem somewhat counter-intuitive: Usually, gossip is
referred to as negative for trust. But, because gossip constitutes information - and gossiping is an information-
structuring process -  it may help to build points of reference (see section 6), and thus to form a possible basis for
ascriptive trust.
21
 Naturally, placing trust does not ensure that the trust is reciprocal - thus, trust does not necessarily lead to co-
operation.
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5. Trust and information cost
The managers in the Salling district - as a group - have learned ascriptive trust and not to base
trust on contracts or strong social regulation. We may understand this in a information cost
perspective: Today, managers choose to continue to operate on the basis of a well-tried practice,
co-operation through ascriptive trust, because information needed to evaluate partners according
to this logic is cheap and abundant. This can be understood as expressed by Malmgren (1961:
419): “The information strategies and decision rules adopted over time are partly dependent
upon information in previous periods, and are conditioned by it, with the result that the rate and
adjustment to new kinds of activities is dependent upon the universality, or lack of it, in the
information structure of previous periods”.
Following this logic, information cost may be a sufficient explanation for the fact that different
origins of trust come to dominate in different contexts (organisations, and, at a larger level,
societies). I shall propose that the different possible origins of trust all have different
information cost, and the different availability of different types of information in different
contexts is the reason why varying degrees and origins of trust can be traced there.
Below, I briefly investigate the information cost of the different possible origins of trust,
starting with contracts, and gradually making the institutional context “thicker” (Amin & Thrift,
1994).
The information cost of contracts
Arrow (1974) has pointed out that in most cases firm-level safeguards such as contracts cannot
take all contingencies into account and suffer from severe monitoring problems. Thus,
paradoxically, trust founded on contracts demands extreme information to be available to both
the participants to the co-operation - and if such information was present, there was no need for
contracts.
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The information cost of social regulation
Information problems also apply for trust founded on societal laws or conventions and
enforcement: Hobbes’ Leviathan is likely to be surprisingly inefficient in promoting trust
between agents due to information problems. The cases where law enforcement or social
regulation is sufficiently efficient to ensure trust may be limited to extremely closely knit
societies. E.g. in the Italian Mafia (Gambetta, 1988), the bosses impose (or threaten to impose)
so severe punishments upon associates who double-cross them that they may trust them not to
do so22. This enforcement however demands such a significant level of information
(surveillance) that, in the cases where the bosses fail to be ‘omnipresent’, there is little ground
for trust. Social regulation functions much better as a basis for trust if it is practised by all the
participating agents. Such decentralised social regulation however still demands the agents to
know in detail about each others’ actions. Hence, even decentralised social regulation is only
efficient when both strong social conventions and cheap information on which to decide for
social sanctions is available - like in expatriate Chinese societies (Whitley, 1990).
The information cost of ascriptive trust
Ascriptive trust also has a information cost: To ascribe honesty to other agents on the bases of
their social characteristics demands (sometimes surprisingly detailed) information of their
whereabouts. The important difference of the information cost of ascriptive trust as compared to
the types of trust described above is that the information type needed is another. Here, the
needed information is not necessarily about other future contingencies; costs; capabilities or
incentives. Rather, what is important is information about the actions of others; paired with a
broad range of information on their origin; history; family ties; profession; and so on. To these
things, one may ascribe a symbolic meaning and place trust accordingly. At the same time, one
may act according to the symbols one wants others to ascribe to oneself (Blumer, 1969; Berger
& Luckmann, 1966).
                                           
22
 Some would argue that this is not really trust, but terror. It is trust - but it only runs one-way.
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6. Information cost and geographical proximity
Above, different origins of trust were described, and their information cost briefly touched
upon. For step-by-step building of trust, ex ante information about the business partner’s
incentives plus ongoing information exchange of information through co-operation was
considered crucial. For trust based on contracts, ex ante information about possible
contingencies as well as ongoing information achieved through monitoring is central. In the
case of social regulation, ongoing monitoring is also central, whereas, in the case of ascriptive
trust, a much broader range of information may form the base for trust, e.g. gossip and personal
advice.
I shall round up the paper by briefly touching upon what determines information ability.
Drawing upon the lesson from my empirical example, I argue that the information necessary for
evolution of ascriptive trust is especially abundant in geographically proximate societies. I shall
argue that in such contexts, the type of information needed for ascriptive trust is ‘social’ and
easily available (i.e. cheap) for most agents through e.g. gossip and advice giving. This may
explain why geographically proximate firms achieve trust easily (Lorenz, 1988; Gertler, 1995;
Maskell & Malmberg, forthcoming).
Information channels
At any level of societies or organisations, information availability and information sharing
between individuals depends on patters of interaction between agents and institutions (Johnson,
1992) and other agents (Melody, 1988): Information channels (Lundvall, 1985).
First, in formalised search processes or through education, agents may achieve codified
information through information channels like public educational institutions or business
services; (the information exchanging act encompassing requisition of books, papers, reports; or
through communication technology such as fax, phone, EDI, etc.). Although Akerlof (1970);
Malmgren (1961); Marschak (1974) and Arrow (1973; 1974) have all devoted their attention to
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the information problem, I know of little empirical research on the importance of codified
information for trust, and the significance of the particular information channels mentioned
above23.
Secondly, when it comes to exchange of less formalised information (complex clusters of
information or tacit information), patterns of personal interactions - dense networks of personal
relations - constitute important information channels (Lorenzen, forthcoming). One can
distinguish between information shared in dyads (Håkansson, 1989) and information shared
through third parts, what Granovetter (1973) calls “weak ties”. Because of their large capacity
for making information ‘social’ amongst a larger group of agents, weak ties or third-part-
relations are important information channels through which agents may construct ascriptive
trust.
‘Code keys’
In addition to information channels, common cultural ‘code keys’ are important (Lorenzen,
forthcoming). "Culture" is a highly ambiguous notion, but for the purpose its information-
structuring abilities may be emphasised.  An important ability of culture as a homogenising
factor is that it leads people to construe their experiences (reception of information) the same
way (Kelly, 1963; Boisot, 1994). Aspects of culture in this respect are language, differences in
which can lead to misunderstanding of information, and prominence (Schelling, 1960), as
contained in artefacts, symbols, or purely cognitive structures, such as mental models (Nonaka,
1995). Differences in what is conceived as important and sense-making (prominent) may lead to
misinterpretation of information. As Arrow (1973: 18) puts it: "No matter how much the
technology of information-processing is improved, the ability of human mind and senses to
absorb signals will be a permanent limitation".  Thus, the ability of firms to share information
and to build knowledge from it depends on similarity of routines in the firms, meaning that they
have skills, practices, language and culture similar enough (Casson, 1997).
                                           
23
 But see Hägerstrand (1968) for a discussion of the role of different information channels for innovation.
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The importance of proximity
The importance of information availability and information sharing for institutions is a classic
theme in economics and sociology (see e.g. Veblen, 1919; Hayek, 1937; Richardson, 1960;
Machlup, 1962). Boisot (1994:12) - drawing on Kroeber & Kluckhohn’s (1952) definition -
goes as far as calling “structuration and sharing or information between individuals and groups
of varying sizes” a most crucial aspect of the “culture” institutionalised in different contexts.
When one investigates such contexts for institutionalisation and formation of trust, it seems
fruitful to take a geographical perspective on information channels and codes: Proximity seems
to matter (Malmberg & Maskell, forthcoming) for information availability. As far as code keys
are concerned, proximity matters, because cultural distance can be closely related to
geographical distance (Lundvall, 1985). Geographical agglomeration of firms, e.g. located in
the same region (and thus speaking same language) and being communities of firms sharing a
common socio-economic environment (and thus conception of what has prominence) can be
beneficial to sharing of tacit information. The cultural coherence of geographically proximate
firms is most likely to be a result of the high degree of interaction between them: Proximity
matters when information channels are concerned, because the channels, through which much
information is shared as "... a body-to-body contact sport, played through physical contact
between people" (Sweeney, 1991: 367) are face-to-face contacts. Business meetings of strategic
or formal nature can be held at conference centres or fancy hotels, but discussions of practical
nature as well as less formal interactions between agents in co-operating firms may more often
happen as daily contact within a certain information contact potential related to geographical
distance (Sweeney, 1991). Further, many information-propagating institutions (e.g. education
and business services) have a local hinterland.
Thus, the cost of transmitting codified information may have diminished with development of
communication and transport technology (Lundvall, 1996), but this may not be the case for the
cost of communicating tacit information. All in all, geographical proximity may be of crucial
importance for information availability. This may explain why the most common origin of trust
in some proximate communities is ascription.
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Conclusion
In the course of this paper, I have argued that, through both ‘organisational’ (i.e., firm-level)
and ‘social’ learning processes, particular ways of trust comes to dominate in given contexts
(i.e., trust has different origins in different contexts). What determines which origin will come
to dominate - at a given point in time - is the information cost of the different possible origins of
trust relative to the information availability in the given context.
This is basically an evolutionary argument: The cheapest way of trusting ‘grows’ in a context. If
the information cost of an origin of trust - or information availability in a context - shifts, the
institutional origin of trust in the context may also shift. This is what has happened in the
Salling district: Availability of information about other producers’ actions has risen
significantly during the latest years with the rise of subcontracting and the strengthening of the
producer’s guild. Correspondingly, ascriptive trust now dominates the co-operation patterns. In
Salling, evolution has only a limited ring of selection: Firms may survive without trust, or if
they place trust on false grounds. The reason that one particular origin of trust came to dominate
was social learning through transmission: News about the ‘best’ way of trusting spread
amongst agents, who then didn’t all have to go through expensive processes of trial-and-error
learning. Earlier, trial-and-error may have dominated - as it may do in other contexts than the
Salling district.
As may be seen, I have tried not to make my argument overly functionalist. Even if the need for
trust is the result of an information problem, I do not propose that trust necessarily arises as the
most efficient organisational solution to problems of co-ordination under imperfect information.
Similarly, even if I have sketched out some possible reasons why ascriptive trust may be cheap
in a geographically proximate area, trust does not necessarily arise in all such contexts.
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